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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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and Harriman remained silent. Acting as the advocate of the Soviets,
Winston Churchill., in a series of five talks, and Eden in six., endeavoured
to explain to the Poles that they would only be able to save one-half of the
Polish Republic at the cost of the renouncement of the other half. And
this remainder would be c strong and independent/ but naturally under
Russian control through the form of a  friendly ' government. In fact,
Mikolajczyk was only asked one question, was he prepared to sign the
new partition of Poland. c Yes ' or ' No ' ? The other problems were
of no interest to Stalin, and he referred Mikolajczyk to the representatives
of the  Lublin Committee ' for any discussion on those topics.
It transpired from the conimunique which they published, that the
c Lublin Committee' had also demanded the dismissal of President
Raczkiewicz and that a new Government should be composed, half from
the members of the c Lublin Committee' and half from the ' Poles in
London.'
There would indeed have been a great political stir had any of those
nine Governments exiled in London endeavoured to contact or unite with
its corresponding ; Lublin ' Government functioning in the country con-
cerned ; had de Gaulle, for instance, come to terms with the * Lublin'
Vichy administration of Laval's, or M. Pierlot, the Belgian Prime Minister
in London, with the Rexist leader, Degrelle, in Belgium, or the Norwegian
Government with the c Lublin * administration in Norway under Quisling.
But the Polish Prime Minister had been requested, more, coerced, to
come to some agreement and union with the c Quisling Lublin * Govern-
ment in Russian-occupied Poland. Mikolajczyk met the representatives
of the * Committee,' on October 16, and the conversation, according to
the Soviet Statement, " facilitated the clarification of the respective points
of view." The Polish Prime Minister had been prepared to negotiate
within the terms of the aforementioned memorandum, which agreed to
the acceptance of a temporary demarcation line between the Polish and
Soviet administration, leaving Wilno and Lwow under Polish powera
while the question of Poland's ultimate frontiers was to be decided at the
Peace Conference, but he could not take it upon himself to renounce^ in
the name of the Polish people, Lwow and Wilno. He refused to be drawn
into a discussion of the Constitutions, nor could he see his way clear to
giving half the seats in the future Government to the Communists, a
Party which, in the two former Polish Parliamentary elections, had gained
no more than 0.40 per cent, of the total representation.*
The * Lublin Committee' was brought very much to the fore in the
subsequent parleys. Churchill, assisted by Harriman, spoke with its
representatives, Bierut, Osubka and Zymierski, a move which could
only be viewed in the light of a step towards the recognitipn of this
* Committee ' as a partner of the Polish Government. Therefore, this
* There were two Polish Communist deputies elected to the Sejm (Parliament)
of 1919 and 1922.
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